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Effects of Expectancy on Assessing Covariation in 
Data: “Prior Belief” versus “Meaning”
Dorrit Billman
Georgia Institute of Technology
and
Brian Bornstein and Jeffrey Richards
University of Pennsylvania
A large number of researchers have addressed the question of how prior beliefs 
affect assessment of covariation in new data. Some have suggested that prior 
beliefs disrupt covariation assessment (Nisbett & Ross, 1980), while others 
have claimed they help (Wright & Murphy, 1984). Research in this tradition 
has not consistently distinguished meaningfulness of the data from expectations 
about the particular relationship between the variables to be assessed. We 
collected covariance judgments on meaningful variable pairs where subjects 
had a prior belief in a positive relation, had a prior belief in a negative relation, 
had a prior belief that the variables are unrelated, or were agnostic about the 
existence or nature of relation. Subjects rated data with negative, positive, and 
zero correlations. We evaluated performance in terms of subjects’ ability to 
discriminate objectively different correlations, rather than simply comparing to 
a reference statistic, and also on the bias subjects showed. Subjects with no prior 
belief, with positive beliefs, and with negative beliefs were all reasonably well 
able to discriminate among different objective correlations. In addition, subjects 
with no prior belief showed appropriate use of the judgment scale, while those 
having a positive or negative expectation were biased in the direction of their 
prior belief. In contrast, subjects with the prior belief that the variables were 
unrelated showed essentially no discrimination. Our results disconfi rm the 
hypothesis that prior beliefs generally facilitate correlation assessment of 
summarized data. Judgments of meaningful data were best when subjects were 
initially agnostic. 
INTRODUCTION
Assessing contingency is a fundamental aspect of learning from experience 
and has been widely investigated for its importance in both informal and 
scientifi c reasoning (cf. Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984, and Crocker, 1981, for 
reviews). Some researchers have stressed how poorly people assess actual 
contingency and how much they are overwhelmed by prior belief; the 
identical objective correlation is judged very differently if it confl icts versus 
is consistent with existing beliefs. Effects of self-fulfi lling prophecies (Snyder 
& Swann, 1978), confi rmation bias in evidence selection (Trope & Hassock, 
1982; Skov & Sherman, 1986), selective encoding of evidence to match 
prior beliefs (Cohen, 1981; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979), and overweighing 
priors in belief revision all focus on the problems stemming from overuse of 
prior beliefs. Chapman and Chapman (1967, 1969) in their work on illusory 
correlation stressed how heavily people relied on prior beliefs which made 
them insensitive to actual patterns in the data. Jennings, Amabile, and Ross 
(1982) emphasized how poor people were at assessing contingency, whether 
the data were meaningful (pictured heights of men and walking sticks) or 
abstract (unlabeled pairs of numbers). Comparing performance across studies, 
Alloy and Tabachnik (1984) suggested that sensitivity to objective correlations 
is only good when relevant prior beliefs are absent or when the expected and 
actual relation are congruent. 
The fact that people are affected by background knowledge, however , does 
not mean that performance is worse when background beliefs are available. 
Only a few researchers have compared performance on covariation assessment 
tasks with abstract versus meaningful variables while equating other aspects 
of the task. Miller (1971) and Muchinsky and Dudycha (1974) looked at how 
accurately subjects’ predictions refl ected objective correlation. Wright and 
Murphy (1984) looked at direct estimation of correlation from summarized 
data. These studies found that people do worse on the abstract variables, though 
this is where prior belief should least disrupt performance. 
It is possible that simply the meaningfulness of the data, aside from 
particular beliefs about them, is the primary factor affecting performance. In 
general, more meaningful material can be held in short-term memory and it 
is easier to encode and retrieve from long-term memory. Since remembering 
and comparing data across the data set is needed for contingency assessment 
(even when all the data is simultaneously present), this might be the primary or 
suffi cient mechanism to explain performance differences with abstract versus 
meaningful data. If this were the case, the nature of the prior beliefs would 
not affect the process of assessment. On the other hand, something about the 
particular content of the prior beliefs does infl uence the resulting contingency 
judgment; where prior beliefs are for a positive correlation, judgments are 
biased positively, and where negative, negatively. While we know background 
knowledge affects contingency assessment, we know little about the manner in 
which different sorts of background beliefs affect assessment or the mechanisms 
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for the effects. Given that abstract variables are more diffi cult to assess than 
meaningful ones, the current research investigates how different types of 
prior beliefs about meaningful variables affect the process and outcome of 
contingency assessment. 
The research reported here addresses three goals. First, we assess how 
the particular type of prior belief affects contingency assessment. Second, we 
consider what is meant by “good” or “bad” assessment and what measures will 
be most informative. Finally, we layout some alternatives in how processing 
may change with different prior beliefs and map these onto expected patterns 
of performance. 
Meaningfulness and Types of Prior Belief 
We distinguish between meaningfulness of individual variables and prior 
belief about how the variables are related. While one cannot have a prior 
belief unless the variables have an established meaning, there are variable 
pairs which are individually meaningful but for which one has no opinion on 
whether or how they are related. These two factors have not been distinguished 
in previous work; subjects probably did have some prior beliefs about how 
meaningful variables were related but these were not assessed. 
Our experiment used meaningful variables which differed in the type of 
prior belief. We compared four belief conditions: Positive (Correlation) Belief, 
Negative (Correlation) Belief, Belief in Zero Correlation, and Don’t Know. The 
fi rst three conditions use pairs of meaningful variables about which subjects 
have a specifi c expectation about the nature of the relationship (or its absence); 
in the latter condition the variables are independently meaningful but subjects 
were agnostic about whether or how they might be related. 
Assessing Effects of Prior Belief 
We assume that the primary value of detecting contingency is telling 
that some things are more related than others. This requires discriminating 
objectively different correlations and encoding this information to allow 
comparison and communication. Typically subjects’ correlation judgments are 
correlated with or compared to a reference statistic, be it Pearson’s correlation, 
percentage variance, or some other metric. This approach assumes that the 
particular scale is psychologically real and should be the standard for estimation 
and it combines underlying discrimination with how the rating scale is used. 
In contrast, we assume only that the direction of the scale and the reference 
point of no relation are meaningful. Rather than comparing to a reference 
statistic, we look for rating differences for different objective contingencies 
and prior beliefs. By looking for changes in the pattern of subjects’ ratings we 
can still evaluate subjects’ estimation. In particular we can assess how well 
subjects discriminate objectively different correlations and whether or how 
this is affected by prior belief. 
We need to contrast discrimination, sensitivity, and bias. Good discrimination 
depends on having reasonably good sensitivity and bias. As in signal detection 
theory (Green & Swets, 1966) sensitivity refers to underlying ability to 
distinguish between objectively different stimuli and bias refers to boundaries 
the subjects sets in using the response categories or points on a rating scale. 
Prior work, comparing judgments to a reference statistic, focused on how 
strongly subjects are biased by prior belief. We are particularly interested in 
whether prior belief affects discrimination. Poor sensitivity always leads to 
poor discrimination, but poor bias can as well. For example, subjects might 
have such a strong positive bias that all judgments would be compressed to 
the “most positive” end of a rating scale and underlying sensitivity could not 
be expressed. 
In sum, several changes follow from focusing on differences across belief 
conditions rather than comparison to a reference statistic. First, we are primarily 
interested in discrimination: Is eating vitamin C or getting lots of sleep more 
related to preventing colds? How does prior belief affect such comparisons? 
While we are interested in differences in bias, we are most interested in their 
possible effects on discrimination. Second, we are interested in identifying 
where poor discrimination might be due to lack of sensitivity and where to bad 
bias. In turn, this helps pin down where in the evaluation process prior belief has 
its effect(s): relatively late in the process, such as deciding how to use the rating 
scale, or earlier, such as making subjects oblivious to data in the fi rst place. 
Effects of Prior Belief on Processing
Prior research strongly suggests that prior beliefs will have a biasing effect 
on assessment of new data. When asked to assess a data set, people seem to 
have a hard time separating what they believe generally is true in the world 
from assessing one particular data set, even when the contrast is made very 
explicit (Kuhn, Amsel, & O’Loughlin, 1988). We consider three, alternative 
effects prior belief might have beyond a simple bias. 
One possibility is that while meaningful data can be assessed more effectively 
than abstract data, the particular sort of prior belief about the variables does 
not change the assessment process. Given meaningful data, a subject will not 
differentially tune out, compare, or evaluate data, from one type of belief to 
another. Subjects would show equal ability to distinguish between objectively 
different correlations in all conditions, once subjects were assessing meaningful 
data. The “Don’t Know” condition would differ in the absence of bias, but 
would be otherwise the same. Indeed, discrimination might be uniformly good 
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across different prior beliefs, but prior work, focusing on the match to some 
particular measure of correlation, might not have identifi ed this. 
Another possibility is that availability of any hypothesis helps in the 
evaluation of data (Wright & Murphy, 1984), above and beyond any effects of 
meaningfulness of the individual variables. Just as the additional structure from 
meaningful variables leads to improved performance, the additional structure 
from a prior belief, be it in positive, zero, or no relation, might further help in 
the assessment process. So, while a prior belief might bias the fi nal estimate, 
it might also help the subject encode or compare data. The value of having 
a hypothesis has been suggested by others for organizing what data to look 
for (Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder; 1974). While this differs from covariation 
assessment tasks, both require integrating evidence across cases. Having a 
hypothesis might benefi t tallying consistent versus inconsistent cases, looking 
for exceptions, or guiding encoding. If this is correct, the Positive, Negative, 
and Belief in Zero Conditions would show similar, good, discrimination, while 
the “Don’t Know” condition would show least discrimination, though also 
least bias. 
Finally, the particular prior belief might affect assessment in a very specifi c 
way, such that the important contrast might be between believing variables are 
totally irrelevant versus believing they are or might be related. This contrast 
may be the most fundamental of all. Related variables usually come from the 
same domain; variables we strongly believe could not be related usually come 
from different domains. With variables in different domains, we typically lack 
theoretical or causal links; hence, forming explanations of correlations across 
domains may require appeals to causal principles we do not trust or believe in, 
such as ESP, divine intervention, or conspiracy theories. Belief in no relation 
seems to entail the greatest change should we be proved wrong and usually we 
only consider whether variables are negatively or positively related if we have 
some reason to think them mutually relevant. Hence subjects might be least 
affected by the data and least able to discriminate differences in the belief in 
Zero Condition and do roughly the same in the three conditions where subjects 
believe the variables are or might be related. 
THE EXPERIMENT
A pilot study using a mixed within and between-subjects design found 
that prior belief interacted with data type: when subjects were in the Positive, 
Negative, or Don’t Know Conditions, they discriminated among the data sets, 
but when subjects believed the variables were unrelated they could not. The 
present study used a completely within-subject design. In addition to a rating 
task, it included a forced choice task to provide another tool for separating the 
effects of bias versus sensitivity. Subjects’ sensitivity, not just discrimination, 
was assessed by having them pick which of two data sets had the stronger 
correlation. Since no rating scale was used, bias could not affect judgment. 
Method
Materials
Variable pairs. We compared performance in four belief conditions: Positive 
(Correlation) Belief, Negative (Correlation) Belief, Belief in Zero Correlation, 
and Don’t Know. We piloted to fi nd variables where subjects shared the same 
expectation. Variable pairs were selected so that while the intended relation was 
generally believed, it was far from logically required. We wanted our subjects 
to be able to imagine how alternative data (with which they were presented) 
might be produced. Variables in the Don’t Know condition were individually 
meaningful but subjects did not have a specifi c correlational belief connecting 
them. Subjects were instructed to respond “don’t know” if they “suspect{ed} 
that there might be some sort of relationship, but {were} sure neither about the 
existence of such a relationship nor about its possible direction.” For Belief 
in Zero variable pairs, subjects reported a prior belief that the variables were 
specifi cally unrelated and independent. 
Piloting identifi ed 12 variable pairs for which there was good agreement 
about the relationship between the variables: two each in the Positive and 
Negative Belief conditions, and four each in the Don’t Know (which showed 
the least consensus) and Belief in Zero conditions (see Table 1). More pairs were 
included for the latter two conditions because we were especially interested in 
a comparison between these conditions. 
Data sets. Three types of data sets—positive, negative, and zero correlation—
were constructed for subjects to judge. Each data set consisted of 15 observations 
for each of two variables, with the observations paired to generate the desired 
correlation. Each set was generated independently to ensure that results were 
not an artifact of one particular data sample. For each pair of variables, a data 
set of each type was generated: Zero: Pearson’s r = 0.0 (±.07); Positive: r = +.5 
(±.03); and Negative: r = –.5 (±.03). Standard normal distributions for each 
set were produced with a random number generator, and the values linearly 
transformed to the mean and standard deviation appropriate for the variables.1 
1 Due to our relatively small sample size, any two sets of variable values might not 
be exactly independent and have the target correlation, The solution was to generate many 
sample distributions and pick those pairs between which the required correlation and 
independence held. These distributions were then linearly transformed to meet the sample 
mean and standard deviation requirements of a given variable, and occasionally slightly 
modifi ed to repair round-off error. 
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In all, 72 sets of observations were independently generated: (12 Variable Pairs) 
* (2 Variables in the Pair) * (3 Correlation Sets per Variable Pair). 
Cover stories. Cover stories for each of the variable pairs described the 
data as generated by a scientifi c study which gathered information about  both 
variables. “Subjects” in the invented studies were given names to increase the 
data’s meaningfulness. Subjects who were questioned informally about the 
data’s credibility after the experiment believed the stories to be authentic. 
Stimulus booklets. Each story booklet consisted of instructions, a rating 
sheet for prior belief about each variable pair, and a page with data for 
each variable pair to be assessed. A cover story appeared at the top of each 
page, followed by two data sets labeled Group A and Group B, each with 15 
observations on both variables. 
For each variable pair, one data set had a zero correlation and the other 
either a +.5 or a –.5 correlation. Across subjects, eight different orderings of 
the variable pairs were used. On half their judgments (Rating), subjects rated 
each of the two data sets separately; on the other half (Forced Choice), subjects 
made forced choice judgments, picking which of the two data sets showed a 
stronger correlation. Each subject saw (1) half the pages with –.5/0 and half 
with +.5/0 pairs of data sets, (2) half with the zero data set on top and half on 
the bottom, and (3) half forced choice and half rating judgments. Each variable 
pair was presented in all eight combinations, creating eight Randomized Sets 
with 12 items in each set. Order of variable pairs was randomized differently 
in each Randomized Set. The answer book had six pages for rating judgments 
and six for forced choice responses. There were two Task Orders of each 
Randomized Set, one with the block of Forced Choice judgments presented 
fi rst and the other with the Rating judgments presented fi rst. 
Design
The balanced design used two experimental factors, Belief (Positive, 
Negative, Belief in Zero, Don’t Know) and Data (Positive, Negative, Zero), 
and three counterbalancing factors, Randomized Set, Task Order, and Item. 
Subjects
Subjects were 48 undergraduate students from a University of Pennsylvania 
paid subject pool. The majority of subjects in this pool have had no statistics; 
some have had an introductory course. They received $3 each for their half-
hour participation. 
Procedure
Subjects participated individually. The experimenter explained the general 
nature of the task and gave out a story booklet with instructions and an answer 
booklet. The instructions gave an overview of the task, explained and gave 
examples of the different types of relationship that might exist between a pair 
of variables (strong or weak; positive, negative, unrelated, or “don’t know”) 
and told subjects they would be judging sets of new data. 
First subjects indicated their current belief about the relation between the 
variables, then they judged the data sets. For each of the 12 variable pairs 
subjects read the cover story, studied the two data sets, and indicated their 
judgment in the answer booklet. For half the variable pairs subjects rated 
each data set individually; for half they decided which had a stronger relation. 
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Forced Choice and Rating judgments were blocked for each subject and 
analyzed separately. In the rating judgments, the subject indicated the strength 
of relationship in the data by marking his or her estimate on a scale of 0 to 
100, where 0 meant “not related” and 100 meant “strongest possible relation.” 
Subjects then indicated for each data set whether the relationship was positive 
or negative (unless they chose 0 on the scale). We used this measure because 
we thought subjects might fi nd strength of relation easy to judge but might not 
operate well in distinguishing positive from negative relations; were this so, 
judgments of size of relation might be a more sensitive index. In the forced 
choice task, the subject picked the data set (Group A or Group B) that showed 
the stronger relationship and then indicated whether the relationship in the 
Group was positive or negative. The two tasks are diffi cult in different ways: 
the rating task requires assigning a number, which the forced choice does 
not, but the forced choice requires considering and comparing two data sets 
together. Finally, subjects were debriefed, and the fabricated nature of the data 
and the purpose of the experiment were discussed. 
Results
Response Classifi cation 
Overall, subjects’ initial beliefs about the relation between two variables 
differed from the intended belief on 31% of the judgments. Subjects were 
especially reluctant to report lack of an opinion (59% disagreed with our 
“Don’t Know variable pairs). To avoid dropping such a large part of the critical 
data, we used subjects’ reported beliefs to redefi ne the Belief condition for 
these judgments. 
Main Effects of Belief and Data on Relatedness Ratings
The primary analysis was a repeated-measure ANOVA of rated relatedness 
with Belief, Data, and Subjects as factors. We combined the magnitude of 
the relatedness estimate with whether it was negative or positive to get the 
rated relationship. (We did comparable analyses of absolute value of the rated 
relationship, but subjects were always less sensitive. Thus, we used the real 
rather than absolute value.) Randomized Set, Task Order, and Item within 
belief were assessed separately; only Item was signifi cant [Item F(41, 506) 
= 2.43, p < .0001]; including Item in the main ANOVA did not change any 
effects. 
Mean ratings by Belief and Data are shown in Table 2 and Fig. 1. The main 
effects of Belief [F(3, 497) = 16.90; p < .0001] and Data [F(2, 497) = 45.42; p 
< .0001] were both signifi cant. (Reduced df come from reclassifi cation to use 
subjects’ own beliefs.) Subjects judged data more positively with positive prior 
beliefs and more negatively with negative prior beliefs, relative to judgments in 
the Don’t Know and Belief in Zero conditions. Post hoc analyses showed that 
the Positive, Negative, and Belief in Zero belief conditions all differed from 
each other but that the Don’t Know condition differed only from the Positive 
condition (Tukey’s HSD, p < .05). Thus, there was a general biasing effect 
of Prior Belief, such that the specifi c nature of the belief—whether positive, 
negative, or zero—shifted subjects’ evaluations of the data in the corresponding 
direction. Subjects’ judgments were also appropriately infl uenced by the relation 
Fig. 1. Judgments of relatedness from Experiment 1. Judged relation for positive (+.5), 
zero, and negative (–.5) correlations in the presented data sets, grouped by prior belief 
about the variable pairs presented. 
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objectively present in the data set. All levels of Data differed signifi cantly from 
one another (Tukey’s HSD p < .05). 
Interaction Effects of Belief and Data on Relatedness Ratings
The Belief × Data interaction is our primary measure of differential use of 
the data in different conditions. The interaction was signifi cant , [F(6, 497) = 
3.44; p < .003] and shows clearly in Fig. 1. The Positive, Negative, and Don’t 
Know belief conditions all showed substantial differences in ratings of the 
positive and negative data, differences of 34 to 47 points. In contrast, ratings in 
the Belief in Zero condition differed only 14 points for positive and negative 
data. As in the pilot experiment, these means suggest that discrimination varies 
across belief conditions, with subjects in the Belief in Zero condition least able 
to discriminate between different objective correlations. 
We explored the nature of this interaction by one-way ANOVAs run 
separately within each belief condition. The ANOVAs for all four belief-
conditions were signifi cant (all F’s > 5.0; p’s < .005). Thus, subjects in the Belief 
in Zero condition did show signifi cant discrimination of the data, although the 
magnitude of the effect is less than in the other conditions (14 vs 34–47 points.). 
Further, subjects in the Belief in Zero condition showed the least variation in 
their ratings. Standard deviations across data types ranged from 16.5 to 25.6 for 
the Belief in Zero condition, as opposed to 24.5 to 36.0 in the other conditions. 
The existence of an interaction, as well as the difference in variances, suggests 
that a Belief in Zero correlation exerts a stronger bias than other types (or an 
absence) or prior belief. It forcefully compresses all ratings toward zero, thereby 
impairing discrimination between different data sets. 
Effects of Belief on Forced Choice Judgments
The forced choice procedure was included to avoid the effects of bias in using 
a rating scale. Differences among conditions in performance on this measure 
could not be due to different biases in using the response scale and must be truly 
due to differential sensitivity. Performance overall was modest, with 60% correct 
and chance performance equal to 50%. However, performance is best in the Belief 
in Zero condition with 73% correct, compared to 53% for Positive and Negative 
belief combined, and 57% for Don’t Know. These differences in percentage 
correct are signifi cant [χ2 = 8.09; p < .02], and only the 73% score is above chance 
[binomial probability <.0001]. These results suggest that if the task is to compare 
data sets directly, the Belief in Zero condition is not at all disadvantaged. The 
fact that subjects in this condition perform at least as well as subjects in the other 
Belief conditions suggests that a major part  of their poor discrimination on the 
rating task is the result of bias and not a lack of underlying sensitivity. 
This fi nding was confi rmed by rescoring the rating data as forced choice 
to compare performance in the forced choice and rating tasks. Equal ratings, 
of which there were many in the Belief in Zero condition, were treated as 
guesses and scored half correct and half as errors. By this scoring, the Positive 
and Negative Belief conditions together had 65% correct, the Don’t Know 
condition 60%, and the Belief in Zero condition 59%. Thus, when effects 
of bias were removed by this rescoring or by the true Forced Choice task, 
the Belief in Zero Condition did not show a disadvantage. Any differential 
performance appears to be caused by an especially strong bias when making 
quantitative judgments, and not by diminished sensitivity. 
DISCUSSION
Effects of Belief on Performance
Our subjects’ primary task was rating strength of relation between two 
meaningful variables. From a normative perspective, performance was best 
in the Don’t Know condition. Here subjects showed good discrimination 
among objectively different correlations. They also showed no evidence of 
bias: the zero point of the rating scale was used for variable pairs with no 
relation while positive and negative judgments were symmetrical around this 
zero point. In comparison, judgments with positive or negative prior beliefs 
showed comparable discrimination but biased use of the scale. Finally, when 
subjects believed that two variables were unrelated they showed the poorest 
discrimination and judgments were compressed in toward the zero rating on 
the scale. 
These fi ndings reject the possibility that all meaningful data are created 
equal and it is just the contrast between meaningful versus abstract data that 
affects discrimination; different types of prior belief about meaningful data 
did have differential effects. Further, these fi ndings reject the hypothesis that 
having any hypothesis, whatever it may be, helps assess contingency in new 
data. The Don’t Know condition, where subjects lacked such a hypothesis, fared 
best considering both sensitivity and bias, and the Belief in Zero condition, 
where prior beliefs are probably most fi rmly held, showed the worst overall 
discrimination. Finally, the fi ndings are consistent with the idea that working 
under the belief that variables might but need not be related provides all the 
benefi ts but none of the costs of assessing meaningful data. 
Clues about Processing: Bias, Discrimination, and Sensitivity
As in prior research, subjects were biased by their prior beliefs. In addition, 
we showed that discrimination, not just bias was affected; the Belief in Zero 
86                 BILLMAN, BORNSTEIN, & RICHARDS IN OB&HDP  53 (1992) EXPECTANCY AND COVARIATION IN DATA                                 87
condition showed very poor discrimination. We would like  to be able to 
determine whether this poor discrimination is due to poor  underlying sensitivity 
or simply the product of a strong bias which com presses all judgments toward 
the zero point. While it would be possible to have good discrimination over 
a very narrow interval of the scale, this would require a corresponding very 
strong reduction in variability. The forced choice judgments were designed to 
distinguish sensitivity from  bias. Overall performance on this task was rather 
poor, but here there was no disadvantage (and in fact better performance) for 
the Belief in Zero condition. Thus our fi ndings are consistent with the view that 
differences  in discrimination across belief conditions stem from differences in 
bias. This suggests that the prior beliefs have most of their effect relatively late 
in the assessment process at the point when a rating is assigned to a perceived 
degree of relatedness. We have no evidence that there are effects on initial 
encoding or evaluating evidence in our tasks. 
From a performance perspective, it does not matter whether poor sensitivity 
contributes to the poor discrimination; a prior belief in unrelatedness produces 
a bias so strong that it would ordinarily preclude the expression of underlying 
sensitivity. From a theoretical perspective, it would be valuable to distinguish 
between these more sharply. 
CONCLUSION
One of the most pervasive fi ndings in contemporary cognitive psychology 
has been the effect of task content. Different content produces different 
performance in logically equivalent tasks. In problem solving  (Kotovsky, 
Hayes & Simon, 1985; Klahr & Robinson, 1981), logical reasoning (Cheng 
& Holyoak, 1985; Griggs & Cox, 1982; Johnson-Laird & Wason, 1977), 
probabilistic decision making (Tversky & Kahneman,  1980, 1983), and 
statistical inference (Chapman & Chapman, 1967, 1969;  Jennings et al., 1982), 
formally isomorphic tasks are treated very differently depending on their 
content. Our experiment traced out similar effects in covariation assessment. 
Meaningfulness of individual variables is distinct from beliefs about  their 
relation and all beliefs are not created equal. There appears to be a   three-way 
distinction: (1) believing that meaningful variables are related  in a certain way, 
(2) believing that they are not related, and (3) not holding  a belief at all. Being 
agnostic about the relation produces the best performance while a belief in no 
relation produces particular diffi culties. This  might result from diffi culty in 
forming a causal link between the variables;  just as causal explanation can lead 
to belief preservation (Anderson &  Sechler, 1986), so might the implausibility 
of possible causal scenarios  produce especially strong belief effects on data 
assessment. 
Our ratings task does have a few close analogs in naturally occurring tasks 
with sports and business statistics, but it is very different from many informal 
learning tasks. Hence, our fi ndings are only suggestive of what the effects of 
prior belief may be when judgments are based on sequential or nonnumerical 
observations. Nevertheless, we believe that our fi ndings may refl ect some very 
basic properties of learning about how attributes are related and the use of 
such knowledge once learned. Specifi cally, establishing which variables are 
mutually relevant or belong to the same domain may be a very fundamental 
part of correlational learning. Some of this partitioning may be innately given; 
much of it is surely learned. Researchers such as Klayman (1984, 1988) have 
argued that discovering which features are predictive is the most important 
component of complex learning. His work shows that discovering what is 
mutually relevant and predictive goes a long way toward predictive success. 
Our work shows that success assessing correlations depends, in turn, on prior 
beliefs about mutual relevance. Indeed, it is striking how deeply the effects of 
prior belief pervaded our task: presumably there was no ambiguity about what 
information was relevant, no problem in selecting what information to attend 
to, and no domain-specifi c assessment procedures where prior beliefs might 
have exerted their infl uence. Nevertheless, prior beliefs about relevance had 
profound and distinctive effects on performance. 
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